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'SOME PROBLEMS IN ADMINISTRATION
OF ESTATES
FREDERICK B. McCALL*
The Clerks of the Superior Court, in carrying out their duties as
judges of the Probate Courts in North Carolina, are confronted with
many problems in connection with the probate of wills and the adminis-
tration of decedents' estates. They must decide difficult questions, the
answers to which are not always made clear either by the case or
statutory law by which they purport to be governed. In the effort to
clarify some problems which had been giving them trouble in the
administration of decedents' estates, the Clerks submitted to the writer,
for discussion at their 38th annual convention held in July, 1956, in
Chapel Hill, several questions of interest and importance to them. This
paper is the result of an attempt on his part to answer such questions.'
The first question submitted was as follows:
I. What procedure should be followed in admitting a will to probate
when the subscribing witnesses are dead and there is no proof that they
signed in the presence of the testator?
This is a good question-one not directly or clearly answered by the
North Carolina law. First, let us examine the statutes. G. S. § 31-3.3
subsection (d) requires that "the attesting witnesses must sign the will
in the presence of the testator but need not sign in the presence of each
other." G. S. § 31-18.1 provides that an attested written will, executed as
provided by G. S. § 31-3.3, may be probated in the following manner:
"Sub-section (3). If the testimony of none of the attesting witnesses is
available, then a. Upon proof of the handwriting of at least two of the
attesting witnesses whose testimony is unavailable, and b. Upon com-
pliance with sub-paragraphs c. and d. of paragraph (2) of this section."
Sub-paragraphs c and d read as follows: "c. Upon proof of the hand-
writing of the testator, unless he signed by his mark, and d. Upon proof
of such other circumstances as will satisfy the clerk of .the superior
court as to the genuineness and due execution of the will."
Sub-paragraph (c) of G. S. § 31-18.1 (2) provides that "The testi-
mony of a witness is unavailable within the meaning of this section when
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina Law School.
The answers are, for the most part, confined to and directed toward the fairly
narrow administration problem raised by the particular question submitted. Hence,
no attempt has been made to discuss, definitively, all of the legal ramifications of,
for instance, joint wills, joint bank accounts, equitable conversion, etc. This paper,
on the whole, retains the same informality of discussion that obtained when it was
read to the Clerks of Court in Conference.
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the witness is dead, out of the State, not to be found within the State,
insane or otherwise incompetent, physically unable to testify or refuses
to testify."
In our case, where the testimony of the witnesses is unavailable
because they are dead, G. S. § 31-18.1-in summary-provides that the
testator's will may be probated upon proof of the handwriting of the
testator, unless he signed by his mark; upon proof of the handwriting of
the two dead witnesses; and upon proof of such other circumstances as
will satisfy the clerk, as to the genuineness and due execution of the will.
Assuming that the handwriting of the testator and that of the dead
witnesses can be proved, how can it be shown that the witnesses signed
in the presence of the testator? This is the crux of our question. Sub-
paragraph (b) of G. S. § 31-18.1 (3) provides that "Due execution of
a will may be established, where the evidence required by subsection (a)
is unavoidably lacking or inadequate, by testimony of other competent
witnesses as to the requisite facts." (Emphasis added.) The attorney
who drew the will or any other competent witness could testify that the
dead attesting witnesses signed in the testator's presence. But suppose
there are no other competent witnesses who could testify to this fact?
Here the statute does not speak; nor does the case law of North Carolina.
Did the legislature intend that an otherwise apparently valid will signed
by the testator and attested by two witnesses whose handwriting can be
proved should not be allowed to qualify for probate? If so, why the
rather elaborate provisions for probate of the will where the witnesses
are rendered unavailable by death? A partial answer may be found in
sub-paragraph (2) d where the itatute adds: "Upon proof of such other
circumstances as will satisfy the clerk ... as to the genuineness and due
execution of the will." (Emphasis added.) What are "such other cir-
cumstances" as will satisfy you that the will was genuine and duly
executed?
Dean Mordecai in his Law Lectures2 says: "The validity of the will
does not depend solely on their [the witnesses'] testimony. If their
memory so fail that they forget their attestation, or they be so wanting in
integrity as to wilfully deny it, the will ought not to be lost, but its due
execution and attestation should be found on other credible evidence.8
The proof of the handwriting of such of the subscribing witnesses as may
be dead, and other facts and circumstances may be shown to establish the
will."4
'A potent "other fact or circumstance" to be considered by the Clerk
in determining the genuineness and due execution of the will is the
22 MoRDEcAI's LAW LECTURES 1264, 1265 (1916).
'Citing Mayo v. Jones, 78 N. C. 402 (1878) and Boone v. Lewis, 103 N. C. 40,
9 S. E. 644 (1889).
' Citing Watson v. Hinson, 162 N. C. 72, 77 S. E. 1089 (1913).
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presence of an attestation clause. This clause usually recites that the
testator declared "the foregoing instrument to be his last will and testa-
ment in the presence of us, who, at his request and in his presence, and
in the presence of each other, have subscribed our names as witnesses."
While an attestation clause is not necessary for the validity of a
will, the use of such which recites all the required formalities of execution
may aid in the establishment of the will at probate or contest. 5 As you
know, the burden is upon the propounder to prove due execution of the
will, which includes the genuineness of the instrument.6 However, in
sustaining this burden of proof, the propounder may be aided by certain
presumptions. Let some of the authorities speak. Redfearn on Wills
7
says: "A proper attestation clause, to a duly signed and attested will...
raises the presumption of the legal execution. Where there is a proper
attestation clause to a will, a prima facie case of execution is made by
proving the signatures of the testator and the subscribing witnesses, or
by proving the actual signing by them, and this proof may be made by
persons other than the attesting witnesses. A proper attestation clause,
with the strong presumption of law as to proper execution which it
raises would be of great value in a case where the witnesses were dead,
or could not remember or denied some of the formalities of execution,
and where the propounder was thus dependent on other witnesses and
circumstances to prove the due execution of the will." (Emphasis added.)
In Corpus Juris it is said: "Where ... in proceedings for the probate
of an instrument as a will, it appears to have been duly executed as such,
and the attestation is established by proof of the handwriting of the
witnesses or otherwise, although their testimony is not available ...it
will be presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary that the will
was executed in compliance with all the requirements of laws including
those relating to publication, attestation in the presence of the testator
. . . and hence the burden of adducing evidence to the contrary rests on
one contesting or resisting the probate. This is especially true where the
will contains a formal attestation clause, for such a clause is presumptive
evidence of the facts which it states. The presumption is, however, one
of fact and not of law, and may be rebutted by evidence ... but clear and
satisfactory evidence is required to negative the presumption."9  (Em-
phasis added.)
I have been unable to find any North Carolina cases dealing with the
recitals in the attestation clause as raising presumptions in favor of the
proper execution of a will. However, this very fact may indicate that
'ATxINSON, HANDBOOK ON WILLS 347 (2d ed. 1953).
6 Dulin v. Dulin, 197 N. C. 215, 148 S. E. 175 (1929); In re Fuller's Will,
189 N. C. 509, 127 S. E. 549 (1925).
REIDFEARN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN FLORIDA 100 (2d ed.
19C6iting cases from about 25 jurisdictions-none from North Carolina.
8 68 C. J., Wills § 749 (1934).
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many wills have been probated on the basis of such presumptions without
objection. It would seem that the handwriting of the testator and of the
dead witnesses having been shown, and it having been recited in the
attestation clause that the witnesses signed in the presence of the testator
-if no evidence to the contrary is offered-you could safely proceed to
probate the will in common form. This action would certainly be within
the spirit of the statute: "Upon proof of such other circumstances as will
satisfy the clerk as to the genuineness and due execution of the will."
"But," you may ask, "suppose there is no attestation clause-then
what?" Then the presumption of due execution is somewhat weaker,
but I think that, nothing to the contrary appearing, you would still be
justified in probating the will on the evidence proving the signatures of
the testator and the witnesses. Atkinson on Wills'0 says: "While due
execution of the will is evidenced by the mere fact that the witnesses
have signed the same,11 at least in some jurisdictions the presumption is
much stronger if there is a proper attestation clause."
Only one case has been found in North Carolina which touches upon
the problem-In re Thomas' Will.12  That case involved a caveat pro-
ceeding in which the original will had been lost. The propounders offered
in evidence the portion of the record of wills containing the will and the
probate. The caveator's objection to the reception of this evidence was
sustained. It was shown, apparently without exception, that when the
instrument was offered for probate in common form one of the subscrib-
ing witnesses had testified to having subscribed the same as witness, and
another, who was not a subscribing witness, testified that the signature
of the other subscribing witness was in his own proper handwriting.
This, with the proof of the death of Thomas, the other subscribing wit-
ness, was the entire evidence offered on the issue. There was no evidence
offered as to the handwriting of the testatrix, and Associate Justice
Avery, denying the probate, said in his opinion: "The propounders failed
to produce any witness who had seen the signature of Ada W. Thomas
[the testatrix] to the original will or the signature of either of the
witnesses or that would testify as to their genuineness." At the time of
the caveat both of the witnesses to the will were dead. The Court, in
upholding the caveat, said that Section 2136 of The Code-now G. S. §
31-3.3 as to the witnesses signing in the testator's presence-must be
construed with Section 2148 of the Code-now G. S. § 31-18.1-as to
the manner of probate re proving the handwriting of witnesses; therefore,
said the Court: "In order that the proofs should be sufficient to justify
the clerk in recording the paper in the book of wills, and to make such
10 ATKINSON, HANDBOOK ON WILLS 347 (2d ed. 1953).
11 Citing in footnote 8, WIGMORE ON EvIDENCE § 1512, and stating: "Some cases
assert that this creates a presumption of due execution."
2111 N. C. 409, 16 S. E. 226 (1892).
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record printa-facie evidence of its due execution by the testator, it was
essential not only that S. J. Gooch [the witness who simply attested
to the handwriting of the dead witness] should have deposed to the
genuineness of the signature of J. W. Thomas, but that he or Sally F.
Gooch [the living witness] should have deposed that he 'subscribed' in
the presence of the testatrix. The probate then being insufficient to
justify entry of the paper on the will book for the temporary protection
of the estate ... it must follow that what purported to be the proof and
the will itself as entered on the book were not competent as evidence for
any purpose whatever ... "13
In this case it will be noticed that there was an attempt to prove, in a
caveat proceeding, the probate of the will in common form on the basis
of an inadequate record-the original will having been lost. Since in
the caveat proceeding the will must be proved de novo, the evidence was
properly excluded.14 Also, as I have pointed out before, the propounders
in the caveat proceeding had failed to produce any witness who had ever
seen the signature of the testator to the original will or the signature of
either witness, or would testify as to their genuineness. Failure of proof
of these facts in themselves would prohibit probate of the will. Thus it
will be seen that the case does not on its facts fall within the purview of
our original inquiry. Nor does it appear in the case whether or not
there was an attestation clause. Until the Supreme Court passes upon
the problem directly posed by your query, I think you might safely
operate on the basis of the solutions I have proposed.
The second question submitted to me was as follows:
II. Joint wills; when a joint will has been probated as to one of the
testators, what procedure should be followed upon the death of the
other testator several years later?
In Ginn v. Edmundson,15 our Court defined a joint will in these
words: "A joint will is a testamentary instrument executed by two or
more persons, in pursuance of a common intention, for the purpose of
disposing of their several interests in property owned by them in common,
or their separate property treated as a common fund, to a third person or
persons, and a mutual or reciprocal will is one in which two or more
persons make mutual or reciprocal provisions in favor of each other."
In Clayton v. Liverman 6 our Court held that a will jointly executed
by two sisters could not be piobated either as a joint will or as their
separate wills, upon the ground that such a will was novelty and un-
known to the laws of this country. However, this case was later over-
13 Id. at 416, 16 S. E. 226, at 228.
"'Wells v. Odom, 205 N. C. 110, 170 S. E. 145 (1933).
15173 N. C. 85, 91 S. E. 696 (1917).
1819 N. C. 558 (1837).
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ruled by the Court in In re Davis' Will.17 In his Law Lectures18 Dean
Mordecai puts it this way: "It was formerly held that a paper writing
purporting to be the joint will of two persons and executed by them, was
not valid, either as the joint will of the two, or the separate will of
either.19 But that case is overruled, and it is now held that such a paper
may be probated as the will of the respective parties as and when they
respectively die."
20
Atkinson on Wills after stating that joint wills formerly were not
recognized as valid, says: "Even today a joint will which expressly or
impliedly does not become effective until the death of the survivor is
invalid. However, in the absence of this factor, there is no reason why
the joint will cannot be regarded as the will of each co-testator and pro-
bated twice, once at the death of each. This is the modern and generally
accepted view."21 And in In re Cole's Will2 2 our Court states: "It has
been uniformly held that on the death of one of the testators the will
thus executed may be admitted to probate as his last will and testament
so far as it disposes of his property."
In the absence of contract based upon a consideration, such wills may
be revoked at pleasure. Persons may make joint wills, which are, how-
ever, revocable at any time by either of them or by the survivor.23
Assuming then, that neither party to the joint will has revoked it-
when one of the testators dies, the will, as to the disposition of his
property, if it has been validly executed, can be probated as his will.
Then when the survivor dies the will is re-probated as his will. Obviously,
the same witnesses will have to be used in the probate of the will of
each. If one or both of the witnesses has died in the interim between
th first probate and the second, then the statute prescribes the procedure
to be followed as to the second probate. In the absence of contest, it
would seem that your record of the first probate containing the affidavits
of the same witnesses should materially assist you in the probate of the
will as that of the surviving testator.2 4
The case of In re Cole's Will 25 presents an interesting situation in
which the will could not be re-probated as the will of the survivor. The
will was the joint will of a husband and wife-written by the husband in
his own handwriting and found among his valuable papers at his death-
and signed by both of them. After ordering the payment of their debts
and providing for decent burial and the erection of headstones at their
17120 N. C. 9, 26 S. E. 636 (1897).
182 MORDECAI'S LAW LEcrURES 1272 (1916).
Citing Clayton v. Livermore, supra note 16.Citing In re Davis' Will, supra note 17.2 1 ATKIxNSON, HANDBOOK ON WiLLs 223 (2d ed. 1953).
22 171 N. C. 74, 76, 87 S. E. 962, 963 (1916).
23 See Ginn v. Edmundson, 173 N. C. 85, at 86, 87, 91 S. E. 696 (1917).
Cf. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31-35 (1950).
' Supra note 22.
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graves, the joint will left everything to the Raleigh Methodist Orphanage.
The will was probated as the holographic will of the husband-the signa-
ture of the wife being treated as surplusage. Obviously, since the wife
did not write the will it did not comply with the statutory requirements
as to a holographic will-for two people could not write such a will-and
therefore it could not be re-probated as her will. After the death of her
husband she did execute another will of her own in which she devised all
her property according to the intention expressed by herself and her
husband in the will in question. The Court said: "If, however, she had
executed a will devising the property to other parties, this would not
invalidate this instrument as the will of her husband."
The third question submitted to me was as follows:
III. Under what circumstances does the doctrine of equitable con-
version apply to the proceeds of the sale of lands or personalty by
executors or administrators? Under what funds should such proceeds
be accounted for and distributed?
This question was so broad and general in its scope, I had to call on
your fellow clerk, Mr. W. E. Church, for an interpretation as to what
you had specifically in mind; and I am indebted to him for his help.
In Clifton v. OWens26 will be found a good discussion of equitable
conversion. The Court said, in part: "Equitable conversion is a change
of property from real into personal or from personal into real, not actually
taking place, but presumed to exist only by construction or intendment of
equity. 'Nothing,' it has been said, 'is better established than this princi-
ple that money directed to be employed in the purchase of land, and
land directed to be sold and turned into money, are to be considered as
that species of property into which they are directed to be converted,
and this in whatever manner the direction is given, whether by will or
by way of contract, marriage articles, settlement, or otherwise; and
whether the money is actually deposited or only covenanted to be paid,
whether the land is actually conveyed or only agreed to be conveyed, the
owner of the fund, or the contracting parties, may make land money or
money land. . . . In order to effect a conversion, it may be stated
generally that, in a trust the direction to convert must be imperative, and
in a contract the agreement must be binding. In a trust created by will
or otherwise the duty to convert must be mandatory and not left merely
to the option or discretion of the executor or trustee, and this imperative
quality may be impressed upon the trust either expressly or by the use
of direct words of command or impliedly or indirectly by a disposition
of the property on such limitations as necessitate a change in character
of it. 'If a testator devises land to be sold, or orders or directs that the
.0 170 N. C. 607, 87 S. E. 502 (1915).
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same shall be sold, it is obvious that it is the imperative duty of the
trustees [or executors] to make the sale. They have no discretion in the
matter.... This is the plainest case of conversion.' Bispham's Equity,
p. 426.))27
Tiffany says: "In order that the doctrine of equitable conversion may
apply, it is necessary that there be an absolute obligation to convert, either
immediately or at a future time, and it is not sufficient that there is a
request or expression of desire to that effect, or a power to convert, with
a discretion in the trustee or executor to whom the power is given, or in
other persons, as to whether it shall be exercised."
28
Resuming the general discussion of equitable conversion, in Clifton v.
Owens,29 Judge Walker said: "So it is said the doctrine of conversion is
not confined to those testamentary dispositions only in which imperative
words are used or wherein limitations which can only be effectuated by
a conversion exist. It is to be applied to all those cases in which a
general intention of the testator is sufficiently manifested to give the
property to the donee in a condition different from that in which it exists
at the time when the will goes into effect. A mere testamentary power
of sale, vested in executors to sell real estate, will not work a conversion;
but if to the power there is added a direction, a conversion will be
effected. There must be an intent to convert, either express or implied.
The question always is-Did the testator intend to give money or to give
land, and has that intention been sufficiently expressed? Once arrived at
the intention, by proper rules of interpretation, and the property will
then be considered as impressed with that character which the testator
designed it should have when it reached the hands of the beneficiary....
The effect of this doctrine of equity is that the court carries out the
principle in all its -consequences. Thus, money directed to be turned into
land descends to the heir; and land directed to be converted into money
goes to personal representatives; money belonging to a married woman
which is diiected to be converted into land is liable to a husband's curtesy;
. . . and in many other cases the enjoyment of the property will be
determined by the rules applicable to it in its changed, and not in its
original, state .... 30 The correlative doctrine of reconversion is well
understood to be the imaginary process by which a prior constructive
possession is annulled and taken away, and the property restored, in
contemplation of equity, to its original actual quality, or where the direc-
tion to convert is revoked by act of law, or by the parties entitled to the
property, which they may elect to do, but where there are several bene-
-7 Id. 607, at 613, 614, 87 S. E. 502, at 505.
231 Tr FAx', REAL PROPERTY § 297 (3d ed. 1939).
2 170 N. C. 607, 614, 615, 87 S. E. 502, 505, 506 (1915).
"0 For a later case discussing these principles, see Mclver v. McKinney, 184
N. C. 393, 115 S. E. 399 (1922).
[Vol. 35
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES
ficiaries they must all, as a general rule, unite in the election in order to
make it effectual." That all the beneficiaries must unite in electing a
reconversion was reiterated by our Court in Seagle v. Harris.31 The
exercise by all of the beneficiaries of the right to take the land prevents
the exercise of the power of sale by the executor who is directed by the
will to sell the land and divide the proceeds.3 2 Such election would not
legally interfere with the testator's intentions, since an absolute gift of
the proceeds from the sale of the property is a gift of the property itself.
I have set forth the above generalities concerning equitable conversion
in the hope that perhaps they will help to clarify your thinking on the
subject.
As we have seen, the difficulty of determining whether or not a will
commands equitable conversion depends often upon the construction of
the testator's intention expressed therein.
As suggested by Mr. Church, some borderline cases arise which may
give you trouble. One case is clear, however, by statute. If there is an
intestacy, where land is sold to make assets to pay the debts of the estate,
so much of the proceeds of the sale as is necessary to pay the debts is
treated as personal assets,33 but the surplus of the proceeds goes to the
decedent's heirs as realty in the same manner as if the land had not been
sold. 34 In other words, the realty is converted into personalty only for
the specific purpose of paying the debts of the decedent. It would seem
that the same result would follow if a testator in his will ordered the
executor to sell sufficient land to pay his debts. The devisees would take
any surplus funds derived from the sale as realty under the will.
A more difficult question arises, when, in a partition proceeding, it
becomes necessary to sell the land and during the pendency of the parti-
tion proceeding one of the tenants in common dies and the question arises
as to the disposition of the share of the proceeds due the deceased
tenant. Is it still real property for the purposes of dower and descent to
the heirs or is it personal property subject to the widow's year's allowance
and distributable to his next of kin? In other words, does the sale operate
as an equitable conversion of the land into personalty? The question is a
troublesome one and I have had difficulty in finding a direct answer
thereto. I shall give you my solution of the problem for whatever it is
worth.
Our Court has held that G. S. Chapter 46 dealing with partition,
applies to compulsory or judicial partition. It does not apply to partition
by agreement.35 G. S. § 46-22 provides that: "Whenever it appears by
31214 N. C. 399, 199 S. E. 271 (1938).
"Duckworth v. Jordan, 138 N. C. 520, 51 S. E. 109 (1905).
"N. C. GEN. STAT § 28-57 (1950).
,N. C. GEN. STAT. § 28-58 (1950).
3373 N. C. 132 (1875).
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satisfactory proof that actual partition of lands cannot be made without
injury to some or all of the parties interested, the Court shall order
a sale of the property described in the petition, or any part of it." We
start with real property owned by two tenants in common; one, or both
of them, wants his share in severalty in the real property. The Clerk
finds as a question of fact that the land cannot be physically divided with-
out injury to the parties. He thereupon issues an order that the property
be sold and the proceeds divided proportionately among the owners of
what was real property. Does this compulsory order of sale work an
equitable conversion of what was realty into personalty for all purposes.
I take the position that it does not. The conversion takes place by virtue
of court order and not necessarily by the consent of the parties. By
virtue of G. S. § 46-15 the wife's right of dower or the widow's dower is
preserved to her in the partition proceeding. The statute provides that
"on decree of sale, the interest on one third of the proceeds shall be
secured and paid to her annually; or in lieu of such annual interest, the
value of an annuity of 6% on such third, during her probable life, shall
be ascertained and paid to her absolutely out of the proceeds." (Emphasis
added.) Our Court has held that the wife is a proper party to the
partition proceedings with the right to be heard when the lands are sold
for division to protect her contingent interests in the proceeds of the
sale, but she has no right to resist the plaintiff's right to partition nor
challenge the power of the Court to order sale for partition.3 6 Obviously
then, the sale does not convert the realty into personalty for the purpose
of defeating the wife's dower. After a portion of the proceeds of the sale
is set aside to take care of the widow's dower, is the surplus money to be
distributed as personalty among the decedent's next of kin or does it go
to his heirs as it would have had it remained real property? I am of the
opinion that it would go to heirs as realty according to the canons of
descent.37 Although I have found no North Carolina case in point, some
clues to the answer may be found in McLean v. Leitch.38 In that
case the Court cited the Illinois case of Smith v. Smith,3 9 and quoted
therefrom as follows: "When partition is among the heirs of a deceased
ancestor, the purpose of the sale is the distribution of the proceeds among
the owners of the undivided interest in the land. Such proceeds, there-
fore, remain impressed with the character of real estate for the purpose of
distribution." Also the Court quoted from In Wentz' Appeal,40 a Penn-
sylvania case to this effect: "The money derived from a sale of land in a
partition proceedings is never real estate, any more in law than in fact,
a8 Barber v. Barber, 195 N. C. 711, 143 S. E. 469 (1928).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1 (1950).
152 N. C. 266, 67 S. E. 490 (1910).30174 III. 52, 50 N. E. 1083 (1898).
40 126 Pa. St. 541, 17 Atl. 875 (1889).
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but for a certain purpose and within a certain limit it is to be treated as
real estate; that purpose is to preserve the quality of the estate, so that it
will vest in the persons who would be entitled to it had it remained un-
converted, and the limit is the first transmission." It could be argued,
therefore, that the money derived from the sale would go to those entitled
to the realty had it not been sold. Obviously, once the sale is confirmed
and the money distributed, the recipients thereof hold the proceeds as
personal property. In Tiffany on Real Property the writer says: "In
case of a sale of land for the purpose of partition, while the proceeds of
the sale obviously belong to those who previously held title to the land,
such proceeds have the character of personalty and not of realty, except
in some jurisdictions, as regards the share of one not sui juris.
' ' 41 This
seems to confirm my last preceding statement.
G. S. § 33-32 covers so fully questions as to the proceeds of sales of
the ward's property in the hands of the guardian, I do not believe any
discussion on my part is necessary.
Another question submitted by you was as follows:
IV. G.S. § 58-213; what would be the proper distribution of the
proceeds of group life insurance payable to the estate of the deceased
when other assets are insufficient to satisfy all debts of the estate?
I think the answer to this question is pretty clear. The statute,4
2 in
part, provides: ". . . nor shall the proceeds thereof, when not made
payable to a named beneficiary, constitute a part of the estate of the
employee for the payment of debts." In other words, group insurance
(unlike other insurance) payable to the estate of the insured employee
is not liable for his debts-even though all the other assets are insufficient
to pay them. It seems that the insurance proceeds, if there is a will,
would go to those persons specifically designated to take them; or if no
persons are so designated, the proceeds, absent a contrary intention,
might pass.under the residuary clause. If the decedent dies intestate, the
proceeds being personalty-should pass under the Statute of Distribu-
tions, G. S. § 28-149, to those entitled to take thereunder. This is a case
where the decedent's creditors may have to suffer-so far as this special
fund is concerned-even as they may have to suffer where the only funds
available in the estate are those recovered for the decedent's wrongful
death.
43
The final question brought to my attention was as follows:
1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 306 (3d ed. 1939).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 58-213 (1950).
"N. C GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1950).
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V. How should joint bank accounts be handled upon the death of one
of the joint owners, when there is no survivorship provision contained
in the joint account agreement?
Finding an answer to this question is a difficult task since the various
courts do not agree upon any one legalistic category into which to place
joint bank deposits or accounts. Some try to work out the problem on
the basis of a gift; others on the basis of a trust; and still others on the
basis of a third-party beneficiary contract with the bank. Lurking in
the background to add confusion to the courts' thinking is the old real
property concept of what constitutes a joint tenancy and the incident
of survivorship attached thereto. The North Carolina Court, as we
shall see, attacks the problem primarily from the gift angle-particularly
where the deposit is made in the names of A or B with no express
provision for survivorship. As Mr. Neil Sowers says, in a law review
comment on the problem: "With the law in this confusion it was only
natural that the banks should seek protection when they were asked to
pay the survivor according to the terms of the account. '44 Accordingly,
a statute-G. S. § 53-146--was enacted in North Carolina in 1917 as
follows: "When a deposit has been or is hereafter made in any bank,
trust company, banking and trust company, or any other institution
transacting business in this State, in the names of two persons, payable
to either, or payable to either or the survivor, all or any of the deposit,
or any interest or dividend thereon, may be paid to either of said persons,
whether the other is living or not; and the receipt or acquittance of the
person so paid is a valid and sufficient discharge to the bank for payment
so made."'45 Statutes of this type are generally held to be for the
protection of the bank and are not determinative of contests between the
donor's personal representative and the surviving donee.
4
6
The applicability of G. S. § 53-146 to a given case was tested in
Jones v. Fulbright.47 In that case a husband deposited money in a bank
on time deposit taking a certificate of deposit in his own name, payable
to himself or his wife on return of the certificate properly endorsed. It
was held, in an action between the husband's administratrix and the wife's
executrix, not to constitute a gift inter vivos of the deposit to the wife,
but the mere appointment of the wife as the husband's agent to withdraw
money, which agency terminated at the death of the husband. Hence,
judgment for the husband's administratrix. The defendant contended
that the deposit was made in the names of both husband and wife, was
payable to either, and upon the death of the husband was payable to the
wife, and cited G. S. § 230-now G. S. § 53-146-in support of his
"8 N. C. L. REV. 73, 74, 75 (1929).
' For a good discussion of this statute, see 9 N. C. L. REv. 14 (1930).
"ATKINSON, HANDBOOK ON WILLS 171 (2d ed. 1953).
197 N. C. 274, 148 S. E. 229 (1929).
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contention. The Court held that "this section applies only when the
deposit is made in the names of two persons, payable to either, or payable
to either or the survivor. The certificates show that the deposits were
made, not in the names of two persons but in the name of S. V. Pickens
only." Whether if the deposits had been made in the names of both the
husband and wife, payable "to either or" without words of survivorship,
the surviving wife would have been entitled to the money, the Court
does not say. In such a case, the statute, by its wording, would seem to
apply to authorize the bank to pay the fund to the surviving wife.
Following Jones v. Fulbright, came the case of Nannie v. Pollard
48
in which T. J. Nannie deposited a sum in the bank's savings department
to the account of "T. J. Nannie or Bessie M. Nannie." This continued
to be the form of the deposit up to the death of T. J. Nannie. The Court
held that in the absence of rebutting evidence the person making a de-
posit in a bank is deemed to be the owner of the fund; that the deposit
did not constitute a gift inter vivos of the fund; that the right of the wife
to withdraw money was only an agency conferred upon her by her
husband, revocable upon his death; that upon his death his administrator
was entitled to the fund. No mention was made of the statute, but Jones
v. Fulbright was cited in support of the result reached.
Again, in Redmond v. Farthing,49 the wife brought suit against her
husband's administrator to recover, after his death, the balance of a
savings deposit in a Durham bank which deposit was in the following
form: "In account with W. P. Redmond or Mrs. Jennie Redmond."
The deposits had been made from time to time by Mr. Redmond but Mrs.
Redmond contended that a large portion of them had been derived from
the sale of her personal property and also from proceeds of .the sale of
lands held by her individually and by her and her husband as tenants by
the entirety. The defendant's answer admitted only that the deposits
had been made, and denied the plaintiff's allegation of an agreement
existing between the plaintiff and her husband that the survivor was to
take the balance upon the death of one of them. The Court denied the
plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, on the authority of
Nannie v. Pollard and Jones v. Fulbright, that in the absence of re-
butting evidence, the husband-depositor was owner of the fund, and that
again there was a revocable agency. The Court said: "The appellant...
virtually concedes that G. S. § 230 [G. S. § 53-146], in the light of
Jones v. Fulbright and Nannie v. Pollard, has no application to the case
at bar in view of the fact that it appears from the admissions in the
pleadings that the deceased husband made the deposits." Thus far,
therefore, it would seem that if the deposit is made by only one of the
8 205 N. C. 362, 171 S. E. 341 (1933).
" 217 N. C. 678, 9 S. E. 2d 405 (1940).
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parties in an account to A or B, the revocable agency theory applies and
the decedent's personal representative is entitled to the fund. In this
case it will be noticed that under order of court the bank paid the amount
of the deposit into the office of the clerk and the husband's administrator
was substituted for the bank as party defendant.
In Hall v. HallI 0 the Court held that where a man has a deposit in a
building and loan association changed upon his marriage to the names
of himself or wife, the effect is to constitute the wife an agent with
authority to withdraw the funds during the lifetime of the husband,
which agency is revoked by his death, and such change does not constitute
a gift inter vivos. It was so held even though the ledger heading showing
the deposit had been changed to read ".J. E. Hall, or wife, Lukie R. Hall,"
and Hall's passbook was changed in the same manner. The fact that he
also signed a written subscription for blank shares of stock which when
issued were to be held for the account of himself and his wife with right
of survivorship did not warrant a finding of a right of survivorship in
the account since it did not appear that the subscription agreement was
executed for the purpose of transferring the account into a joint account,
there being no evidence of record that the agreement related to the
existing account. As a result of the holding, the wife, who, as
administratrix had after payment of debts, etc., listed the balance as a
disbursement to herself individually, had to disgorge one-half of it to her
son, the other distributee of her intestate husband. The Court, however,
intimated that the wife might have been entitled to the entire deposit if
she had shown sufficient evidence to connect the subscription agreement
with the deposit.
The latest case to raise the question of the status of joint accounts is
Bowling v. Bowling.51 The Court was concerned with four different
accounts, with reference to the proper disposal of which the wife, as
administratrix, had asked the Court's advice. The first was a savings
account opened with the building and loan association by the wife in the
following manner: "Mrs. Agnes P. Bowling &/or Dr. W. W. Bowling."
In opening this account she transferred money belonging to her in another
bank and also money derived from a joint account with her husband in
another bank, with respect to which she had the right of withdrawal. As
to this first account there was no independent record of the source or
identification of deposits or the disposition of the withdrawals therefrom.
The second account was an optional savings account opened in the
name of: "Bowling, Dr. W. W. or wife, Mrs. Agnes P. Bowling" which
was signed by both of them and an agreement was made with the bank
o235 N. C. 711, 71 S. E. 2d 471 (1952).
*'243 N. C. 515, 91 S. E. 2d 176 (1955). For a comment on this case and a
more detailed analysis of the legal implications of joint bank accounts see Note, 35
N. C. L. REv. 75 (1956).
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that all moneys and accumulations thereon were held for their account
"as joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in com-
mon."
A third account was opened on substantially the same terms, with no
independent record of the source of deposits.
In addition to the savings accounts above described there was, in the
estate, a certificate for 125 shares of common stock in a life insurance
company, registered as follows: "William W. Bowling and Mrs. Agnes
Paulk Bowling, as joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as
tenants in common."
The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision that as to the
first account and the insurance stock the wife was entitled to one-half
each of the funds and stock-this, since there was no evidence sufficient
to establish whether the deceased's estate or the wife was the sole owner
of the entire funds of the account or the shares of stock. The Court said:
"Under the laws of this jurisdiction, nothing else appearing, money in
the bank to the joint credit of husband and wife belongs one-half to the
husband and one-half to the wife," citing Smith v. S"ith. 52 By the
phrase, "nothing else appearing," the Court meant that where there is no
evidence of an intention to make a gift, the principle of equality of division
followed.
5 3
The Supreme Court also upheld the lower court's decision as to ac-
counts two and three: that by survivorship the wife took the entire pro-
ceeds of both accounts. This result was predicated on the basis of the
contractual agreement of husband and wife that the personal property
should be held by them "as joint tenants with right of survivorship and
not as tenants in common."
I have dwelled at length on these cases in order to give you a picture
-perhaps a confused one-of the state of the law pertaining to joint bank
accounts. It seems pretty safe to assume that if either party-husband
or wife-deposits money in a joint account payable "to A or B" with no
express provision-usually indicated on the deposit card of the bank
signed by both of them-for a joint tenancy with right of survivorship,
the North Carolina Court-no contrary evidence appearing-will treat
the deposit as a revocable agency, revoked by the death of the original
depositor. The decedent's personal representative will be entitled to the
deposit as against the survivor. If the deposit certificate shows the
deposit was made in the names of two persons, the bank will be protected
if it pays the balance to the survivor. However, the Court has made it
clear in Bowling v. Bowling, just discussed, that if the deposit card is
signed by both the parties and they have expressly agreed that the de-
52190 N. C. 764, 130 S. E. 614 (1925).
Turlington v. Lucas, 186 N. C. 283, 119 S. E. 366 (1923).
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posit shall be held by them as joint tenants with right of survivorship,
and not as tenants in common, the survivor, by contract, is entitled to the
money on deposit. In that case the Court raised no question as to
whether or not the the formalities reqqired by G. S. § 52-12-regarding
contracts between husband and wife affecting the corpus or income of
the wife's real or personal estate for more than three years"4-would
have to be observed in this type of contract between themselves and the
bank in order to bind the wife's estate in the event she should predecease
her husband. Some attorneys and some of the clerks of court are of the
opinion that the formalities required by the statute should be complied
with; but, for the present at least, the question remains unanswered.
In the case of joint bank accounts it would seem to be the duty of the
decedent's personal representative, immediately after his qualification, to
investigate the bank records to determine the status and nature of the
deposit and then proceed accordingly. As has been said, the statute"
is for the protection of the bank, and does not preclude action between
the personal representative and the payee to determine the status of the
deposit as an asset of the decedent's estate. If the bank has not already
paid the account to the survivor, it should, upon the clerk's order, hold
the account until the issue of ownership is settled.
Clearly, a remedial statute is badly needed in view of the unsettled
state of the law with regard to joint bank accounts. As a matter of fact,
such a statute was submitted to the 195356 and 1955r, legislatures by the
General Statutes Commission, but was defeated each time it was intro-
duced because the legislature felt that the joint bank account could be
used as a device to defeat the creditors of the depositors. "Arguments
that present court decisions recognize the right of joint owners of
personalty to create the right of survivorship by contract, and that con-
sequently the proposed legislation would do no more than make clear a
way of doing that which can now be done, but which cannot be done with
sufficient certainty, did not satisfy a majority of the members of the
House where the bill was defeated."5 8  There seems to be a growing
popular demand for the enactment of a statute not only to remove some
of the uncertainties now prevailing in the law with reference to joint
bank accounts but also to facilitate the use of such accounts in order to
"'The statute requires that such contracts be in writing; that the wife's ac-
knowledgment and privy examination be taken; and that the certifying officer
incorporate in his certificate a statement of his conclusions of fact as to whether
or not said contract is unreasonable or injurious to the wife.
"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 53-146 (1950).
"' Senate Bill 29.
" House Bill 65.
11 This statement was made by Mr. William F. Womble, an attorney of Winston-
Salem, N. C., in a paper on joint bank accounts read by him at the thirty-seventh
Annual Conference of the Association of Superior Court Clerks in Asheville, N. C.,
July 7, 1955.
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pass the account to the survivor of the joint depositors. Obviously such
a statute will have to be carefully drawn to obviate the serious objection
already raised to this type of legislation. In any event, we do not believe
that the joint bank account, utilized mainly for convenience by husband-
and-wife depositors, is intentionally employed by them as a device for
defrauding or defeating their creditors.
